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“WITH UNTIRED SPIRITS AND FORMAL CONSTANCY”*: BERNE-
COMPATIBILITY OF FORMAL DECLARATORY MEASURES TO 
ENHANCE COPYRIGHT TITLE-SEARCHING 
Jane C. Ginsburg** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Formalities are back in fashion. Their acolytes fall into two camps, reflecting their different 
objectives. For formalities, which we shall define as conditions on the existence or enforcement of 
copyright, can divest authors of their rights, or instead enhance authors’ exploitation of their works 
by alerting their audiences to the authors’ claims. For one camp, formalities’ confiscatory 
consequences, once perceived as barbaric,1 are to be celebrated.2 The more works from their 
authors’ rights untimely ripped, cast into the public domain, or amputated in their enforcement, the 
better. Formalities can supply the cure for all copyright’s ills, from over-inclusive subject matter, to 
over-strong rights and remedies, to over-long duration. Worried that copyright’s low originality 
threshold embraces shopping lists and such? A notice requirement will flush out such unworthy 
scribblings. Scared of strike suits from obscure authors emerging from the woodwork to claim the 
latest hit song, blockbuster film, or bestselling novel as the fruit of their own inspiration? Locking 
the courthouse door to the unregistered, or precluding statutory damages, will keep them and their 
contingency-fee’d counsel back behind the wainscoting where they belong. Distressed that 
copyright’s term just keeps going and going and going? Imposing a renewal obligation early and 
often will ensure that only those works whose proprietors truly “care” about them will get the full 
copyright term. That copyright-divesting or -disabling formalities tend in practice to penalize 
 
* Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, II, 1.  
** Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University School of Law. Many 
thanks to John Briggs and Philip Sancilio, both Columbia Law School class of 2013, and to Prof Susy Frankel, Prof. 
Daniel Gervais, Maria Martin Prat, Prof. Tom Merrill, Prof. Victor Nabhan, Prof. R. Anthony Reese, and Prof. Alain 
Strowel, Dr. Stef van Gompel, and Dr. Silke von Lewinski. 
1 Comments of John M. Kernochan (1986), reprinted in Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne 
Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513 app. B at 685, 689 (1986) (“The present sanction of forfeiture, in particular, 
is barbaric in its impact (i.e., it may wipe out the entire value of years of creative effort); it is disproportionate to any ends 
served and should be done away with.”) 
2 See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004); James Gibson, Once and Future 
Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 168 (2005) Lawrence Lessig, Re-Crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 56 (2006); Martin Skladany, Unchaining Richelieu's Monster: A Tiered Revenue-Based Copyright Regime, 16 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 131 (2012); cf. Séverine Dusollier, (Re)Introducing Formalities in Copyright as a Strategy for the Public Domain, in OPEN 
CONTENT LICENSING: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 75 (Lucie Guibault & Christina Angelopoulos, eds. 2011) 
(advocating formalities as a means to opt out of—rather than into—copyright protection). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2262924 
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individual creators far more than corporate copyright owners3 does not dissuade the forces of 
formalities, for authorship has little purchase with these advocates of the formality-fed public 
domain. 
A second camp enlists formalities to populate not the public domain, but the public record.4 
Notice, registration, and recordation, as declaratory measures, inform the public of the author’s 
claims and, by facilitating rights clearance, help the author disseminate and derive compensation 
from her work. I prefer to call title-searching information “declaratory measures” rather than 
“formalities” because only “formalities,” in their Berne Convention sense (as we shall see), entail the 
loss of copyright or truncation of its scope or the limitation of remedies. The aspirations of the 
second camp tend toward information rather than confiscation, but many may be concerned that 
only the threat of the latter will impel provision of the former.5 
The perceived need to give title-searching measures teeth by penalizing authors who fail to 
declare or to register their claims allows the rhetoric of reformalization to conflate formalities’ two 
distinct goals. Recognizing that the “good cop” face of formalities tied to title searching may attract 
more followers than the “bad cop” function of expropriating authors, some reformalizers may offer 
the kinder, gentler rationale of reducing search costs in support of declaratory obligations whose 
nonfulfillment will confiscate the copyright.6 Not all the laments about high transactions costs, 
 
3 Julia D. Mahoney, Lawrence Lessig’s Dystopian Vision, 90 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2329–30 (2004) (reviewing LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND 
CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004)): 
What Lessig neglects to mention is that all formalities impose burdens, and that those burdens are 
experienced most keenly by the inexperienced and uneducated. While it is by no means definite that 
the costs of more formalities would outweigh the benefits, Lessig should at least acknowledge that 
corporate copyright holders are likely to have a much easier time negotiating the system than the lone 
individual creator, and that a turn to more formalities could bestow an advantage on none other than 
the ‘Big Media’ interests Lessig abhors. 
Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 375, 383 n.27 (2005) (noting formalities “could actually discriminate against individual creators who are unable 
to carry the burden of legal counseling and registration.”); Brad A. Greenberg, More Than Just a Formality: Instant 
Authorship and Copyright’s Opt-Out Future in the Digital Age, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1028, 1048–50 (2012) (discussing costs to 
individual creators of complying with registration formalities). 
4 See, e.g., STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2011); Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with 
Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 316 (2010). 
5 See, e.g., VAN GOMPEL, supra note 4, ¶ 1.3, at 12 (excluding purely voluntary measures from consideration “because they 
can produce limited effects only, given that their compliance relies on goodwill and proactivity on the part of authors 
and copyright owners”); David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 178–80 (2009) (positing 
“orphan works issue” as “an information problem that blocks the functioning of well-defined entitlements” and 
proposing as solution “mak[ing] availability of the full panoply of copyright remedies . . . contingent on compliance with 
registration, notice, and recordation provisions,” such that “[a]uthors who fail to comply would still enjoy copyrights, 
but these rights would be enforceable only through a default license so that infringers could use the work so long as they 
pay a nominal statutory fee”). But see Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 346 (claiming “[a]n efficient registration system may 
provide its own best incentive” but noting “we are not likely to enjoy such a centralized system unless it is adequately 
staffed and supported by government funding.”). 
6 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 2, at 70–71: 
[I]f permission is required, then we need a way to know from whom that permission must be secured. 
Yet the abolishment of formalities has removed any easy possibility of knowing. A work is protected 
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however, withstand analysis. For even were authors easily found and negotiations simplified, the real 
problem for many enthusiasts of formalities is having to transact at all, when, in their view, the 
object of the proposed transaction should not, or should no longer, be protected in the first place.7  
This Article addresses the Berne Convention’s prohibition on the imposition of “formalities” on 
the “enjoyment and the exercise” of copyright,8 and the compatibility with that cornerstone norm of 
declaratory measures to enhance title-searching. In the Berne context, “enjoyment” means the 
existence and scope of rights; “exercise” means their enforcement. Voluntary provision of title-
searching information on a public register of works and transfers of rights is fully consistent with 
Berne and should be encouraged. But may a member state impose sanctions or disabilities on 
foreign authors for failure to supply that information? I specify “foreign authors,” because the Berne 
Convention’s minimum substantive norms (including the no-formalities rule) do not apply to 
domestic authors in the work’s country of origin.9 So, in theory, the United States could go back to 
punishing its own authors by re-enacting notice and registration requirements whose non 
observance will deprive the work of protection or render any rights unenforceable. But this theory 
breaks down under two pressures. One is political, for a member state may not long treat its own 
creators much worse than foreigners. The other is practical, as digital media facilitate manipulation 
of a work’s country of origin through remote first publication in a country less benighted than the 
author’s residence.10 Most of the prescriptions this Article offers will therefore apply equally to U.S. 
and to foreign works. 
Part II of this Article will address conditions on the existence or enforcement of rights. It 
concludes that “formalities” prerequisite to the initial attachment or persistence of protection, or 
that limit the scope of minimum rights or the availability of remedies, violate the norms of 
 
whether or not you can identify who the owner is; it is a felony to use that work in certain ways, even 
if there is no one to ask for the permission to use it. 
See also Gibson, supra note 2, at 227–28: 
Perhaps most important, registration could help lower troublesome search costs. Consider that a 
potential licensee of a work must incur the expense of identifying and tracking down the copyright 
owner before licensing negotiations can even begin. If the copyright owner’s name and address are 
not readily available, these search costs might prove prohibitive, even when the copyright owner 
would gladly have issued the license for a reasonable price, or for free. If the law required authors to 
include their names in a copyright notice and record any subsequent assignments of copyright in a 
public registry, these costs could be avoided or significantly reduced. (footnote omitted) 
7 [Cross-reference to Fred von Lohman’s contribution to this Symposium on the “dark matter of the internet”] 
8 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(2), Sept. 28, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-
27 [hereinafter Berne]. Similar prohibitions exist in other multilateral conventions to which the United States is a party, 
see, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property art. 9(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
[hereinafter TRIPS] (“Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the 
Appendix thereto.”); WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 1(4), Dec. 20, 1996 (extending protection to computer programs and 
databases: “Contracting Parties shall comply with Articles 1 to 21 and the Appendix of the Berne Convention.”); WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 20, Dec. 20, 1996 (extending protection to sound recordings and certain 
performances: “The enjoyment and exercise of the rights provided for in this Treaty shall not be subject to any 
formality.”); see also Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances art. 17, June 24, 2012 (extending protection to 
audiovisual fixations of performances and certain unfixed performances: “The enjoyment and exercise of the rights 
provided for in this Treaty shall not be subject to any formality.”). 
9 See Berne, supra note 8, art. 5(3). 
10 Id. art. 5(4) (defining the “country of origin” of a work).  
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Berne and subsequent multilateral instruments. By contrast, it may be permissible to condition 
Berne+ subject matter or rights on compliance with declaratory measures. The Berne+ path, 
however, risks descending into controversies of characterization, as one contender’s “plus” proves 
another’s “minimum” norm.  
Part III of this Article will consider declaratory measures regarding ownership of rights under 
copyright. The Berne Convention generally does not cover copyright ownership, and one may urge 
that conditions on who may enjoy or exercise rights are a matter distinct from disabilities imposed on 
existence or enforcement in general. Accordingly, requiring transferees to provide information 
pertaining to the transfer of rights, and imposing sanctions for noncompliance, should be Berne-
compatible. Specifically, I propose making the validity of a transfer of copyright depend on the 
transferee’s recordation in the Copyright Office of the contract or “a note or memorandum of the 
transfer”11 containing sufficient information to permit third parties to ascertain who owns what 
rights in the work.12 Part III then endeavors to resolve some of the practical problems a mandatory 
recordation of transfer obligation might engender. These include time limits for recording the 
transfer, gaps in the title-searching record, and effect on transfers of rights in non-U.S. works when 
the United States is one of the territories covered by the grant. 
II. EXISTENCE AND ENFORCEMENT  
A. HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE BERNE NO-FORMALITIES RULE 
From the outset of the mid-19th century movement for international copyright, authors 
advocated the abolition or restriction of formalities. In the 19th century, to obtain protection at 
home and abroad, an author would have needed to comply with the formalities of each country in 
which he sought protection—assuming the country of which the author was not a national extended 
any protection at all to foreign claimants.13 Proper compliance was cumbersome, costly, and often 
unsuccessful, hence authors’ demand as early as the first international Congress aimed at securing 
authors’ rights, held in Brussels in 1858, that authors be protected in all countries so long as they 
satisfied whatever formalities their home countries imposed. The 1886 and 1896 versions of the 
Berne Convention adopted this approach.14 
In practice, however, it turned out to be difficult to prove to foreign authorities that the author 
had complied with the country of origin’s formalities.15 As a result, the 1908 Berlin revision 
prohibited the imposition of formalities on foreign authors altogether, although member states 
 
11 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (validity of a transfer dependent on writing signed by transferor). While the transferee could 
record the entire contract, concerns for confidentiality of information concerning price and non-copyright aspects of the 
agreement might warrant recording something less than the entire contract—so long as the document contains 
information essential to rights-clearance.  See Copyright Office policy decision on recordation of documents, part 3. 
“redaction of documents” http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2005/70fr44049.html; 37 C.F.R. 201.4(c)(2); Copyright 
Office Compendium II Copyright Office Practices, sec 1610. 
12 17 U.S.C. § 205 permits, but does not require recordation of contracts of transfer. 
13 Sam Ricketson and Jane C. Ginsburg, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE 
CONVENTION AND BEYOND (2006) [hereinafter “Berne Book”], ¶¶ 1.19, 1.40. 
14 Id. ¶¶ 6.102–.103, 6.83–6.85. 
15 Id. ¶¶ 6.86-6.87. 
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remained free to require that domestic authors affix notice, register claims, and/or deposit copies 
with local authorities.16 And, to ensure that an author’s failure to carry out domestic formalities—
with a consequent loss of protection in the country of origin—would not affect the availability of 
international protection, the Berlin revisers specified that “apart from the provisions of this 
Convention, the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to 
protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is 
claimed.”17 The effect of this language was to confer copyright throughout the Berne Union, 
automatically and upon creation, on every Convention-covered work created by an author who was 
a national of a Berne Union member state, or first published within a member state. The no-
formalities rule thus fundamentally undergirds the Berne Convention system of universal 
international authors’ rights. 
But what are “formalities” in the Berne sense? Article 5(2) declares that “the enjoyment and the 
exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality.”18 Although earlier texts refer to 
“conditions and formalities,” it has long been understood that the term “any formality” 
encompasses both “formal and material conditions” on the existence or enforcement of rights.19 
“These rights” are “the rights which the[] respective laws [of the countries of the Union] do now or 
may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention.”20 
Thus, a foreign author is entitled to national treatment in Berne member states (but without having 
to comply with any formalities the state may impose on its own authors), as well as to any additional 
Convention-guaranteed rights, even if these are not afforded to local authors.  
The “enjoyment” of local or Berne minimum rights extends to “‘everything which must be 
complied with in order to ensure that the rights of the author with regard to his work may come into 
existence’. These would include such requirements as registration, the deposit or filing of copies, the 
payment of fees, or the making of declarations.”21 In addition to the initial attachment of protection 
(since 1908 automatic upon creation for authors from other Berne member states), the concept of 
“enjoyment” of copyright would include the persistence of protection for the minimum Berne term 
of copyright; obligations to register and renew copyrights thus would fall under the prohibition.22 
The scope of rights (including any limitations or exceptions) also comes within the “enjoyment” of 
Berne and national rights.23 A member state may neither condition the initial attachment of 
copyright on compliance with formalities nor subsequently deny coverage of particular rights to 
 
16 Id. ¶¶ 3.12, 6.87. 
17 Berne, supra note 8, art. 5(2) (art. 4(2) in the Berlin revision). 
18 Id. 
19 See generally Berne Book ¶¶ 6.102-6.104. 
20 Berne, supra note 8, art. 5(1). 
21 Berne Book ¶ 6.103, quoting the German delegate Meyer at the 1884 Diplomatic Conference, Actes 1884. 
22 See e.g., VAN GOMPEL, supra note 4, at 195. 
23 In addition to art 5(1)’s command that “Authors shall enjoy” rights under national law and under Berne minima, 
Berne arts. 11, 11bis, 11ter, 12 and 14bis all provide that “authors shall enjoy” the specific minimum rights to public 
performance, adaptation and cinematographic works. 
6 
authors who fail to meet declaratory obligations. Thus, for example, a member state may not make 
the adaptation right24 subject to registering the work or filing a notice of reservation of rights. 
Berne precludes not only formalities that condition the existence of copyright, but also those 
that freight its “exercise.”25 Without the second prohibition, an author might be vested with copyright, 
but unable to enforce her rights unless she complies with a variety of prerequisites to suit or to 
availability of remedies.26 Copyright-specific conditions on access to judicial process or to injunctive 
relief (including seizure and destruction of infringing articles) or to actual damages therefore 
contravene Berne norms. By contrast, general litigation obligations, such as payment of filing fees, 
or general procedural or evidentiary requirements, while they may affect the enforcement of a 
copyright claim, are not “formalities” in the Berne sense so long as they apply to all actions, 
whatever the subject matter.27 Beyond these general observations, specific issues concerning the 
Berne-compatibility of declaratory obligations that condition the enforcement of rights warrant 
fuller development in the next Section.  
B. DECLARATORY OBLIGATIONS GOING TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS 
1. Permissible conditions 
Not every “condition” on the existence or enforcement of protection is a prohibited 
“formality.” For example, under Berne article 3, a work will not be protected in the Union unless its 
author’s nationality or its place of first publication meets the condition of being a Berne member 
state. Article 2(2) allows member states to make fixation in material form a condition of protection. 
Once a work does qualify for protection under the Convention, however, member states may not 
impose declaratory or other conditions precedent to the enjoyment or exercise of domestic and 
conventional rights. With this possible exception: with respect to works still under copyright in their 
countries of origin, but in the public domain in a newly-acceding member state (or still under 
copyright in the new member state, but in the public domain in other member states), article 18(1) 
requires member states to restore the copyrights in these works, but article 18(3) allows member 
states to determine “the conditions of application of [the restoration] principle.”  
A member state may not decline to restore copyrights in qualifying foreign works in the local 
public domain: article 18(3) makes clear that the restoration principle must be applied. But that 
 
24 Berne, supra note 8, art. 12 provides that “Authors of literary or artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of 
authorizing adaptations, arrangements and other alterations of their works.” 
25 Berne, supra note 8, art. 5(2). 
26 Van Gompel, supra note 4, ¶ 5.3.2, at 200 (“it seems that the word ‘exercise’ was added so as to elucidate that the 
prohibition did not only cover constitutive formalities, but also formalities that are prerequisites to sue.”). 
27 Arguably, the 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) system of notice and takedown could be considered a “formality” because notice is a 
prerequisite to relief. Nonetheless, the argument is unpersuasive because the information that § 512(c)(3) requires is not 
a condition precedent to seeking relief akin to the § 411 pre-suit registration obligation, but corresponds to what one 
would have to prove in court. The requirements that, in a civil action, the author prove that she is the author, that she 
created the work, that she published it on a particular date, and that the work is original, are not “formalities,” but are 
the facts in issue. Berne art. 5(2) does not dispense the author from proving those facts in the proceeding that will 
determine if she is entitled to relief. It means that the author need not register a document attesting to those facts before 
she can even initiate a procedure to seek relief (at which she will have to prove the facts). Transposed to § 512(c)(3), the 
facts in the notice are the facts that must be pleaded to obtain the temporary restraining order-like remedy of a 
takedown. They are the procedure, they are not a screen barring the author from access to the process. 
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provision grants member states considerable latitude to determine how to restore copyright in 
formerly public domain foreign works. “Conditions” on the implementation of restoration might 
well include declaratory obligations. For example, section 104A of the U.S. copyright law reinstates 
copyright automatically,28 but protects “reliance parties” who had exploited the work in good faith 
before its restoration, by requiring restored copyright owners to file a “Notice of Intent to Enforce 
Restored Copyright” in the Copyright Office or by service on the reliance party.29 In other words, 
before she may enforce her copyright against a reliance party, the author or copyright owner of a 
formerly public domain work must comply with a detailed declaratory obligation30 in order to put 
reliance parties on notice of the restored owner’s claims. By virtue of article 18(3), this declaratory 
obligation, albeit a significant limitation on the enforcement of copyright, seems fully compatible 
with Berne norms. 
2. Incentives versus Obligations: Rewarding the Effectuation of  Declaratory Measures by Offering 
Litigation or Remedial Enhancements 
If Berne prohibits the imposition of sanctions for noncompliance with declaratory obligations, 
another approach might be to substitute carrots for sticks. Authors who comply with registration or 
other requirements might enjoy evidentiary advantages or qualify for additional remedies. 
a) Evidentiary advantages 
Evidentiary advantages might provide meaningful incentives to authors or rightholders to 
register their works and record transfers of rights, thus facilitating title searching. For example, 
according presumptive probative value to the publicly-recorded information if the registration or 
recordation is made within a certain period31 may encourage compliance with these declaratory 
measures. Making timely registration prima facie evidence of a work’s originality, thus placing the 
burden on the defendant to prove lack of authorship, may further stimulate registrations.32  
 
28 See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(A) (“Copyright subsists, in accordance with this section, in restored works, and vests 
automatically on the date of restoration”). 
29 Id. § 104A(c). 
30 The details are set out in id. § 104A(e). 
31 See, e.g., 17 USC §§ 410(c) (certificate of registration serves as prima facie proof of information there recorded, if 
registration is effected within five years of publication), 412 (statutory damages and attorneys fees available only if work 
registered before infringement occurred, “unless . . . registration is made within three months after the first publication 
of the work”). See [1993] COPYRIGHT, 142, 154; ¶¶ 73–76 (permissibility of laws giving registration information the 
effect of a rebuttable presumption of the correctness of the information). Reinbothe & von Lewinski indicate that 
measures to “facilitate proof of authorship” are not prohibited formalities. See Jörg Reinbothe & Silke von Lewinski, 
THE WIPO TREATIES 1996 at 61, ¶¶ 27 (2002). 
32 There may be extra-copyright incentives as well, see, e.g., Nat’l Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of 
Denv. (In re Peregrine Entm’t, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 197, 201–02 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that “a security interest in a 
copyright [must be] perfected by an appropriate filing with the United States Copyright Office,” rather than “a UCC-1 
financing statement filed with the relevant secretary of state,” because “any state recordation system pertaining to 
interests in copyrights would be preempted by the Copyright Act.”). But see Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where 
Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1645, 1680–95 (1996) (criticizing In re Peregrine for 
conflating security interests in copyright-related receivables with such interests in copyrights themselves); see also Patrick 
R. Barry, Note, Software Copyrights as Loan Collateral: Evaluating the Reform Proposals, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 581, 589–90 (1995) 
(“The second part of [In re Peregrine’s] ruling, which holds that security interests in accounts receivable can only be 
perfected by recordation with the Copyright Office, is more questionable and has been criticized by commentators.”). 
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b) Remedial advantages 
Berne’s prohibition on formalities requires that the basic copyright remedies, such as injunctive 
relief and actual damages, remain available to foreign authors who have not locally registered their 
works or undertaken other locally-imposed declaratory measures. Although the Berne Convention 
itself specifies no remedies other than border seizures of infringing copies,33 Berne anticipates that 
member states will supply the “means of redress.”34 These are determined by local law,35 but, over 
and above the national treatment rule, they remain subject to the overall no-formalities proviso. It 
has been suggested that Berne does not in fact require member states to include injunctive relief 
within their remedial arsenals, and that member states might therefore condition that remedy on 
compliance with declaratory measures, leaving undeclaring authors with some form of equitable 
remuneration in lieu of injunctions.36  
This contention ignores a great deal, notably copyright history, the text of the Berne 
Convention, and the explicit requirement of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) that member states provide injunctive relief from copyright infringement.37 First, 
Berne’s delegation to member states’ laws to provide the means of redress occurred against a 
background of widespread (probably universal) domestic provision of injunctive relief. Indeed 
orders prohibiting reproduction and distribution, backed up by confiscation of infringing books (and 
even type fonts), date to the earliest days of copyright and before. For example, the first 
international copyright treaty, the Convention between the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Austrian 
Empire, of 22 May 1840, mandated: 
over and above the penalties pronounced against infringers by the laws of the two States, the 
sequester and destruction of the copies of the infringing articles, as well as the molds, the 
prints, the copper plates, the lithographing stones, and all other objects employed to commit 
the infringement, shall be ordered.38  
The first copyright act, the British Statute of Anne (1710) provided that the “offender or offenders 
shall forfeit such Book or Books and all and every sheet or sheets being part of such Book or Books 
to the proprietor or proprietors of the copy thereof who shall forthwith damask and make waste 
paper of them.”39 And before copyright, sixteenth-century Papal printing privileges systematically 
charged the executing magistrates to confiscate books printed, sold, or imported without the 
author’s or publisher’s permission.40 
 
33 Berne, supra note 8, art. 16. 
34 Id. art. 5(2). 
35 Id. 
36 Sprigman, supra note 2, at 555-60. 
37 TRIPS, supra note 8, arts. 41(1), 44(1), 46.  
38 Conv. Austro-Sarda, art. XVI (“Oltre le pene pronunciate contro ai contraffattori dalle leggi dei due Stati, si ordinerà 
il sequestro e la distruzione degli esemplari e degli oggetti contrafratti, e così pure delle forme, stampe, dei rami, delle 
pietre, e degli altri oggetti adoperati per eseguire la contraffazione;”).  On the Austro-Sardinian Convention in general, 
see Laura Moscati, Il caso Pomba-Tasso e l'applicazione della prima convenzione internazionale sulla proprietà intellettuale, in 
MÉLANGES EN L'HONNEUR D'ANNE LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD 747, 754-57 (Paris 2009). 
39 The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 2. 
40 See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Proto-Property in Literary and Artistic Works: 16th Century Papal Printing Privileges, 36 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 345 (2013). 
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Second, while Berne does not specify remedies, it does impose detailed conditions on the 
availability of compulsory licenses. A member state may not substitute an equitable compensation 
remedy for actual damages or injunctive relief unless, with respect to the reproduction right, the 
remedy passes the “three-step test”41 or, with respect to certain communications to the public, meets 
the criteria of article 11bis(2). Were injunctive relief not the norm, there would be no need to specify 
when a member state may substitute a monetary remedy. The TRIPS Agreement has generalized the 
application of the three-step test to limitations on rights not already addressed in the Berne 
Convention.42 The third step (the limitation “does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the author”) may permit a member state to limit relief to equitable remuneration,43 but only if the 
remedy is limited to “certain special cases” that “do[] not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work.”44 It would be perverse, to say the least, were noncompliance with formalities to qualify as a 
“special case” under the three-step test, thus enabling member states to evade the no-formalities rule 
by making nonfulfillment of formalities the gateway to compulsory licensing. This gambit thus has 
the “merit” of violating not one but two Berne norms. 
Finally, even if Berne did not presume the default remedy of injunctive relief, TRIPS clearly 
obliges member states to provide for injunctions. In addition to requiring compliance with articles 
1–21 of the Berne Convention (thus including the no-formality rule),45 TRIPS specifies: 
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available 
under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual 
property rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent 
infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements.46 
 
41 Berne, supra note 8, art. 9(2) (setting forth the test: 1) “certain special cases” which 2) “does not conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the work” and 3) “does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author”). 
42 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 13; accord Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, ¶¶ 6.80–.81, 
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Section 110(5) Panel Report] (“[N]either the express wording nor the context 
of Article 13 or any other provision of the TRIPS Agreement supports the interpretation that the scope of application of 
Article 13 is limited to the exclusive rights newly introduced under the TRIPS Agreement” and thus “appl[ying] Article 
13 of the TRIPS Agreement to the rights provided under Articles 11(1) and 11bis(1) of the Berne Convention (1971) as 
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement.”) 
43 See Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 42, ¶ 6.229 (finding “prejudice to the legitimate interests of right holders 
reaches an unreasonable level if an exception or limitation causes or has the potential to cause an unreasonable loss of 
income to the copyright holder” and citing WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention for proposition that “where there 
would be serious loss of profit for the copyright owner, the law should provide him with some compensation (a system 
of compulsory licensing with equitable remuneration).” (quoting WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE 
BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971) ¶ 9.8 (1978))). 
44 See Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 42, ¶¶ 6.112, .183, which finds that article 13’s treatment of “certain 
special cases” “requires that a limitation or exception in national legislation should be clearly defined and should be 
narrow in its scope and reach” and that: 
[A]n exception or limitation to an exclusive right in domestic legislation rises to the level of a conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the work . . . if uses, that in principle are covered by [the exclusive right 
owned] but exempted under the exception or limitation, enter into economic competition with the 
ways that right holders normally extract economic value from that right to the work . . . and thereby 
deprive them of significant or tangible commercial gains. 
See also TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 13 (using conjunctive “and” when listing test elements). 
45 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 9(1). 
46 Id. art. 41(1). 
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The “enforcement procedures as specified in this Part” include “order[ing] a party to desist from 
an infringement.”47 TRIPS provides for two other remedies related to injunctive relief: border 
control of piratical copies48 and destruction of infringing articles.49 As a result, if ever there had been 
any ambiguity as to a member state’s power to condition the availability of injunctive relief on 
fulfillment of formalities, TRIPS forecloses any such option.  Arguably, TRIPS merely requires that 
member states’ courts have authority to impose injunctions, not that they in fact exercise that 
authority. Textual sophistry aside, given the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement to “ensure” 
effective enforcement of intellectual property rights, to read TRIPS as merely giving member States 
an option, rather than imposing an obligation, to provide for injunctive relief seems self-defeating.50  
“[S]hall have authority” allows member states to apply their general criteria for awarding injunctive 
relief (for example, conditioning the remedy on a showing of inadequacy of monetary relief51), but 
those criteria cannot be so restrictive as routinely to result in the denial of injunctions, otherwise 
member states could eviscerate TRIPS’ mandate to provide for injunctive relief.52  By the same 
token, a member state may not systematically withhold injunctive relief simply because the author or 
rightholder has not complied with copyright formalities, otherwise it would reintroduce through the 
back door a restriction barred by TRIPS’ incorporation of Berne norms.  
 
47 Id. art. 44(1) (“The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party to desist from an infringement . . . .”). 
48 Id.:  
. . ., inter alia to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of imported 
goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual property right, immediately after customs 
clearance of such goods. Members are not obliged to accord such authority in respect of protected 
subject matter acquired or ordered by a person prior to knowing or having reasonable grounds to 
know that dealing in such subject matter would entail the infringement of an intellectual property 
right. 
49 Id. art. 46: 
In order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial authorities shall have the 
authority to order that goods that they have found to be infringing be, without compensation of any 
sort, disposed of outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm caused to 
the right holder, or, unless this would be contrary to existing constitutional requirements, destroyed. 
The judicial authorities shall also have the authority to order that materials and implements the 
predominant use of which has been in the creation of the infringing goods be, without compensation 
of any sort, disposed of outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to minimize the risks 
of further infringements.  
50 See, e.g., DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS ¶¶ 2.510, .529 (4th ed. 
2012) (summarizing article 41(1)’s “shall ensure” mandate as “insist[ing] on the effectiveness of action, including 
expeditious remedies to prevent infringement,” and explaining that “a systematic refusal . . . to apply [required judicial] 
powers may constitute nullification or impairment”). See also id. ¶ 2.540 (addressing TRIPS article 44(2) permission to 
limit remedies to monetary relief in the case of remedies against governments; TRIPS’ toleration of sovereign immunity 
from injunctive relief underscores the general mandate to provide injunctive relief against non-government infringers); 
TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 31 (with respect solely to patents, authorizes “adequate remuneration” in certain highly detailed 
instances of “use by the government or of third parties authorized by the government.”). 
51 See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (discussing criteria for awarding injunctive 
relief). 
52 Thanks to Prof. Susy Frankel for this point. 
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c) Other “incentives”: remedies in excess of  TRIPS minima, such as statutory damages and 
attorney’s fees 
If Berne and TRIPS preclude conditioning express or implicit conventional minimum remedies 
on fulfillment of formalities, might member states create incentives for compliance with declaratory 
measures by subjecting additional remedies to a compliance obligation? In other words, might there 
be a category of Berne+ remedies for which imposition of formalities would be permissible? When 
the United States joined the Berne Convention in 1989, it retained the provision in the Copyright 
Act that limited availability of statutory damages and attorney’s fees to works which had been 
registered before the infringement occurred.53 This provision was thought to afford meaningful 
incentives to registration that are “compatible with Berne since it deals with certain specific remedies 
rather than the ability to obtain redress at all.”54 In general, the argument holds that remedies that 
exceed the protections mandated by international instruments are not subject to the Berne minima 
no-formalities rule. So long as the member state requires its own authors to comply with any 
declaratory obligations, then imposing the same obligations on foreign authors remains consistent 
with the rule of national treatment. Berne neither addresses nor, arguably, assumes availability of 
statutory damages and attorney’s fees; TRIPS includes these measures among its specified remedies, 
but it does not require member states to provide them.55 It might follow that conditioning the 
availability (to local and foreign authors alike) of these remedies on some act of public filing is both 
Berne- and TRIPS-compatible. 
Berne- and TRIPS-compatibility, however, should turn on assessment whether the “plus” 
remedies are in fact extra frills, or instead are necessary to effective enforcement of copyright. 
TRIPS article 41(1) provides: “Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in 
this Part are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of 
intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement” (emphasis added). One might contend that, 
given the high costs of litigation and the difficulty (and cost) of proving actual damages, a copyright 
claimant cannot as a practical matter effectively enforce her rights in the United States without the 
prospect of statutory damages and attorney’s fees. The claim, which may well be plausible, would 
benefit from empirical demonstration.  
In the absence of such a showing, these remedies remain optional under TRIPS. Notably, 
TRIPS article 45(2) provides that “members may authorize the judicial authorities to order recovery 
of profits and/or payment of pre-established damages even where the infringer did not knowingly, 
or with reasonable grounds to know, engage in infringing activity.” Contrasting article 41(1) 
(“members shall ensure”) with article 45(2) (“may authorize the judicial authorities”), it does not 
appear that TRIPS mandates the availability of statutory damages (“pre-established damages”). Non-
U.S. authors may have a somewhat stronger, but ultimately unsuccessful, claim that attorney’s fees 
figure among the minimum remedies that TRIPS member states must afford. Article 45(2) also 
 
53 Pub. L. 94-553, Title I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2583 (1976) (amended 1990, 2005, and 2008; current version at 17 U.S.C. § 412 
(2006)). 
54 Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 565 
(1986). 
55 TRIPS, supra note 8, arts. 44(1), 45(2); see infra text accompanying notes 59–62. 
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states that “the judicial authorities shall also have the authority to order the infringer to pay the right 
holder expenses, which may include appropriate attorney's fees.” The “have the authority” language 
echoes that of article 44(1), which I have said, together with article 41(1) requires member states to 
provide for formality-free injunctive relief.56  But while article 45(2) may oblige member states to 
award court costs to a prevailing plaintiff, the award of attorney’s fees remains permissive (“may 
include” (emphasis supplied)).  
The non-mandatory character of these remedies, however, does not necessarily mean that a 
member state that chooses to include them may also condition them on compliance with formalities. 
Structurally, one may contend that all of the TRIPS provisions pertaining to copyright, whether 
substantive or remedial, are subject to the overarching no-formalities rule by virtue of TRIPS’ 
incorporation of Berne’s norms.57  As a result, even optional remedies may not be conditioned on 
compliance with formalities.58   
At first blush, TRIPS’ text might rebut such a conclusion. Under TRIPS article 9(1), “Members 
shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention.”  TRIPS article 2(2) specifies, 
“Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that Members 
may have to each other under . . . the Berne Convention.” If TRIPS creates a new obligation or, in 
the case of statutory damages and attorney’s fees, a new option, how do attendant formalities 
“derogate” from existing duties? Similarly, the requirement to “comply with” the Berne Convention 
may not mean that the cited articles of the Berne Convention condition TRIPS substantive norms 
that fall outside the scope of the Berne Convention. Berne article 5(1) establishes that the duty of 
national treatment does extend to new rights and remedies that TRIPS member states implement in 
their national laws, because the Berne norm covers “the rights which [Union members’] respective 
laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals.”59 Thus, a TRIPS member could not, for 
example, provide formality-free statutory damages to its own authors while requiring foreign authors 
to have registered their works as a prerequisite to obtaining that remedy. But if the TRIPS member 
imposes the formal prerequisite on local and foreign rightholders alike, it is not clear that it will have 
“failed to comply with” articles of a treaty that do not incorporate optional remedies.60  
Ultimately, however, arguments based on the optional or mandatory character of the remedy 
under TRIPs miss the mark. As discussed earlier, Berne does not explicitly incorporate any remedies, 
other than border seizures. The “existing [Berne Convention] obligation” from which TRIPs does 
not derogate, pertains not to any particular remedy, but to a member state’s remedial scheme as a 
whole. We have posited that member states may not condition the basic remedy of injunctions (nor, 
for that matter, actual damages) on compliance with formalities because such a limitation would 
effectively eviscerate the no-formalities rule: a right cannot be “exercised” if it cannot be enforced. 
 
56 See supra note 47. 
57 TRIPS, supra note 8, arts. 2(2), 9(1). 
58 Thanks to Prof. Susy Frankel for this point. 
59 Berne, supra note 8, art. 5(1) (emphasis added). 
60 By contrast, protection for the additional copyright subject matter of TRIPS’ article 10 (computer programs and 
databases) cannot be conditioned on formalities, because article 10(1) explicitly treats software as Berne subject matter, 
and article 10(2) adopts the “intellectual creations” formula from Berne article 2(5), thus also arguably inserting original 
databases into Berne, rather than establishing them as outside Berne. 
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But nothing in the Berne text authorizes distinctions among types of “exercise” that cannot be 
subjected to compliance with formalities. On the contrary, Article 5(2) equates “enjoyment and 
exercise” of Berne minima and national treatment rights with “the extent of protection, as well as 
the means of redress.” Member states’ freedom to determine the “means of redress,” including by 
devising remedies additional to the basic forms of monetary and injunctive relief, does not entitle 
them to selective adherence to the no-formalities rule. Suppose, for example, that a member state 
provided expedited judicial or administrative process for copyright infringement claims, but only if 
the rightholder had registered the work before the alleged infringement occurred. This procedural 
advantage, albeit innovative and perhaps unique to that member state, is nonetheless a “means of 
redress.” The Berne+ remedies argument thus rests on a fundamental fallacy. Article 5(2) does not 
distinguish between traditional or basic remedies and additional, unusual, or new remedies: all 
remedies come within “the means of redress.” Under this reading, there is no such thing as a 
Berne+ remedy, and therefore no basis to impose formalities on the availability of some remedies 
but not others. 
C. OTHER BERNE+ APPROACHES 
If there are no Berne+ remedies on which to condition compliance with declaratory measures, 
are there nonetheless other aspects of copyright to which a Berne+ approach might apply? For 
example, conditions on Berne+ subject matter, duration, and rights might all fall outside the no-
formality rule (assuming, for purposes of the rule of national treatment, that local authors also 
incurred the same duties61). 
1. Subject matter 
 Article 2 of the Berne Convention sets out the subject matter that member states must protect. 
Notably absent are sound recordings. And Berne’s coverage of computer programs and databases is 
arguably ambiguous.62 But those gaps have been filled by other treaties that also incorporate the no-
formalities proviso.63 There are, however, two categories of article 2 works that are susceptible to 
Berne-compatible declaratory obligations. Article 2(4) provides, “it shall be a matter for legislation in 
the countries of the Union to determine the protection to be granted to official texts of a legislative, 
administrative and legal nature, and to official translations of such texts.” 
 
61 Berne+ subject matter, rights, and remedies that come within the ambit of the TRIPS Agreement remain subject to 
national treatment and MFN obligations.  See Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-
Violation Disputes, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1023, 1031–32 (2009). 
62 On computer programs, see SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY ¶ 7.13, at 232 
(2008): 
The question of whether computer programs are covered as ‘works’ under the Berne Convention and, 
consequently, benefit from national treatment and minimum rights, is not easy to answer; indeed, for 
some time after the emergence of computer programs, views were quite divergent and no authentic 
interpretation could be ascertained. 
(footnotes omitted).  See also 1 Berne Book, supra note 13, ¶¶ 8.92–-.103, at 491–97 (arguing that computer programs fall 
within Berne subject matter both on first principles and as a matter of state practice).  On databases, see id. ¶¶ 8.88–.91, 
at 489–91 (arguing that Berne subject matter includes original compilations of data). 
63 See treaties cited supra note 8. 
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Berne thus permits member states to exclude official texts altogether from the subject matter of 
copyright: the phrase “determine the protection” may also be understood to authorize the coverage 
of official texts, but subject to various conditions, such as declaratory obligations. 
Article 2(7) allows member states: 
. . . to determine the extent of the application of their laws to works of applied art and 
industrial design and models, as well as the conditions under which such works, designs and 
models shall be protected. Works protected in the country of origin solely as designs and 
models shall be entitled in another country of the Union only to such special protection as is 
granted in that country to designs and models; however, if no such special protection is 
granted in that country, such works shall be protected as artistic works. 
This rather convoluted provision64 allows member states to separate works of applied art from 
other artistic works and to prescribe a distinct (non-copyright) regime in which formalities might 
feature.65 Article 2(7) derogates from the general conventional rule of independence of international 
protection from the existence of protection in the country of origin, because article 2(7) provides 
that if the country of origin protects applied art only under a non-copyright regime, then Union 
countries may similarly restrict the protection of the foreign work of applied art. Thus, if the country 
of origin covers a work of applied art only by means of a design patent (hence, through a mandatory 
registration system), other Berne members may also require that the work be registered (and comply 
with other prerequisites). But, if the country of origin protects applied art under copyright or if the 
Berne member where protection is sought does not have a special regime for applied art, the Berne 
member must accord formality-free copyright protection to the work of applied art. As a result, 
whether Berne members may impose formalities on works of applied art depends on the nature of 
protection in the country of origin. 
2. Duration 
We have noted that formalities, such as renewal registrations, that condition the duration of 
copyright during the Berne minimum term violate article 5(2).66 But member states might institute 
mandatory renewal obligations after the lapse of the Berne minimum term. Thus, a member state 
with a life+70 term might condition domestic and foreign authors’ enjoyment of the extra twenty 
years on a renewal filing. Moreover, if the term of protection in the country of origin is shorter than 
the term in the country of protection (for example, life+50), then the rule of national treatment does 
not apply, and member states may either deny the last twenty years of protection altogether67 or 
impose renewal obligations on foreign works, so long as they also required the same of local 
authors.68  
 
64 For its history, see, for example, 1 Berne Book, supra note 13, ¶¶ 8.59–.69, at 453–69. 
65 See VAN GOMPEL, supra note 4, ¶ 5.1.2.2, at 170. 
66 Supra text accompanying notes 18–24. 
67 See Berne, supra note 8, art. 7(8) (“however, unless the legislation of that country otherwise provides, the term shall 
not exceed the term fixed in the country of origin of the work”). 
68 The rule of national treatment remains as a general background obligation. See 1 Berne Book, supra note 13, ¶¶ 6.93–
.97, at 312–18. 
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Consider the following concrete example. The Berne minimum term for cinematographic works 
is fifty years from first making available to the public with the consent of the author.69 For pre-1978 
works, the U.S. term of protection is 95 years from publication, as it is for works made for hire 
created as of 1978; audiovisual works frequently are works made for hire.70 If a Berne member 
state’s domestic duration for cinematographic works does not exceed the Berne minimum, the 
United States could, consistently with Berne, withhold protection for the remaining forty-five years 
altogether, or condition protection on fulfilment of a renewal obligation in the United States, subject 
to the rule of national treatment. If the copyright’s duration in the country of origin exceeds the 
Berne minimum, but is less than the U.S. duration,71 the Berne Convention calls for the rule of the 
shorter term: unless the host state’s legislation provides otherwise, the foreign work will be 
protected for the length of the term in the country of origin, rather than for the longer term in the 
host country.72 As a result, the United States could require a renewal registration for protection to 
apply between expiration in the country of origin and expiration of the United States’ ninety-five-
year term, or it could simply deny protection for the remainder of the U.S. term. For that matter, 
Congress could, consistently with Berne, require initial and renewal registrations of U.S. and foreign 
audiovisual works fifty years (the Berne minimum) following their first publication or making 
available to the public. 
3. Rights 
At first blush, one might conclude that, given both the breadth of the Berne minimum 
substantive rights (as supplemented by TRIPS, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)) and the principle of national treatment, there are no 
Berne+ substantive rights whose exercise might be conditioned by an obligation to comply with 
declaratory measures. As our analysis of “Berne+ remedies” indicates, even if the “extent of 
protection, as well as the means of redress”73 exceed Berne minima, a member state may neither 
impose formalities on the availability pf the remedy, nor on the scope of the right; “Berne+ right” is 
as much a misnomer as “Berne+ remedy.”  But some might conceptualize an expansion of Berne 
rights into Berne+ territory through the back door of exceptions. National laws might start from the 
exceptions and limitations that Berne either mandates or permits member states to impose, and then 
might provide that the otherwise permissible exception or limitation would not apply if the author 
or rightholder undertook a prescribed declaratory measure. In effect, this approach would allow 
 
69 Berne, supra note 8, art. 7(2). 
70 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 302, 304 (2006). 
71 For example, under the EU Term Directive, the duration of protection of audiovisual works is 70 years from the 
death of the last survivor of the director, the screenwriter, or the composer of the score. Council Directive 93/98/EEC, 
of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 2(2), 1990 O.J. 
(L 290) 9, 11. It is conceivable in a given case that 70 years could elapse from the last survivor’s death before 95 years 
from publication have run out. 
72 Berne, supra note 8, art. 7(8). The United States does not currently apply the rule of the shorter term. See 17 U.S.C. § 
104(a)–(c). 
73 Berne, supra note 8, art 5(2).  See discussion supra text accompanying note 62. 
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authors to “opt out” of an exception or limitation by declaring their objection to its application.74 
Berne article 10bis(1) arguably supplies the template, stating: 
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction 
by the press, the broadcasting or the communication to the public by wire of articles 
published in newspapers or periodicals on current economic, political or religious topics, and 
of broadcast works of the same character, in cases in which the reproduction, broadcasting or such 
communication thereof is not expressly reserved. . . . (emphasis added) 
In other words, the reservation from the exception in effect expands the author’s rights to cover uses 
which otherwise would permissibly have limited the scope of the reproduction and communication 
rights.  
Is the express reservation opt-out then a Berne-compatible declaratory measure that might apply 
to other otherwise permissible national law exceptions? The most abrupt answer is “no” because 
declaratory measures still condition the “extent of protection”: whether formalities come in at the 
front end (the availability of the right) or at the back end (the applicability of an exception), they still 
shape the scope of protection.  A less curt answer is “probably not.” A predecessor version of the 
article 10bis(1) reservation was introduced in the original 1886 Berne Act (in then-article 7), and 
carried over in the 1908 Berlin Revision (then-article 9(2)), whose travaux explicitly state that the 
reservation option was not a formality.75 Since the 1908 Berlin Revision also established the no-
formalities rule, this assertion should carry some weight. The simplest interpretation characterizes 
the reservation as “lex specialis,”76 a sui generis provision that, although it may derogate from the 
default no-formalities norm, does not create a basis for generalization into a technique for instituting 
declaratory measures. 
A slightly longer answer would emphasize the context in which article 9(2) of the Berlin 
Revision arose. Although today the provision (now article 10bis(1)) looks like an opt-out from a 
limitation on the scope of the rights of reproduction and communication to the public, and 
therefore arguably like a condition on the scope (enjoyment) of Berne minimum rights, at the time 
of the provision’s drafting, it operated more like a condition on the protection of Berne+ subject 
matter. At that time, the subject matter the provision addressed —“any article published in a 
newspaper or periodical”—was widely believed not to be copyrightable in the first place.77 The 
 
74 This approach differs from the one advocated by the Copyright Principles Project, which would render an 
unregistered work more subject to the fair use defense than a work whose copyright had been registered. See Pamela 
Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 
1200 (2010) (“Unregistered works would still be protected by copyright law against exact or near-exact copying that 
would cause commercial harm, but fair uses might well be broader as to such works.”). This proposal violates Berne 
article 5(2) because it makes the scope of copyright dependent on registration: failure to comply with the registration 
formality means that the work will be subject to greater incursions on exclusive rights than registered works would be. 
75 Rapport Présenté a la Conférence au Nom de sa Commission (Louis Renault, Président et Rapporteur), in UNION 
INTERNATIONALE POUR LA PROTECTION DES ŒUVRES LITTERAIRES ET ARTISTIQUES, ACTES DE LA CONFERENCE 
REUNIE A BERLIN DU 14 OCTOBRE AU 14 NOVEMBRE 1908 AVEC LES ACTES DE RATIFICATION, 240 (Bureau de 
L’Union Internationale Littéraire et Artistique 1910) [hereinafter Records of the 1908 Revision Conference]. 
76 See, e.g., SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 
1886–1986, ¶ 5.85, at 224 (1987); Alexander Peukert, A Bipolar Copyright System for the Digital Network Environment, 28 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 66 (2005). 
77 For an extended discussion, see Records of the 1908 Revision Conference, supra note 75, at 249–54. 
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original Berne act of 1886 excluded “the news of the day” and “mere items of press information” 
from the Convention’s subject matter (this exclusion persists in article 2(8) of the current text). 
Further, the 1886 Berne and 1896 Paris Revision texts denied coverage to articles “of political 
discussion.”78 The existence of international copyright protection for anything published in a 
newspaper was thus both questionable and controversial, as the evolution of the text in 1896 and 
1908 reveals. The 1896 revision clarified that newspaper serializations of novels were fully 
protected;79 the need to safeguard serials attests to the taint periodical publication must have had on 
works that would otherwise seem amply copyrightable. The 1908 travaux allude to journalists’ 
contentions that their writings deserved “greater respect.”80 Berlin Act article 9(2) thus was a 
compromise measure to provide copyright protection to otherwise excluded subject matter, 
provided the rightholder (generally the publisher) reserved the rights.81 In context, therefore, the 
article 10bis(1) is better characterized as a declaratory measure intended to bring Berne+ subject 
matter within the ambit of protection than as a condition on the scope of protection.  
Taking article 10bis(1) out of context, for the sake of argument, how might its express 
reservation approach be generalized to import declaratory measures into the scope of rights? It is 
important to bear in mind that this technique cannot impose conditions on Berne minimum rights, 
else it will fail under the general article 5(2) prohibition. Thus, any exception or limitation from 
which an author might opt-out by means of an express reservation must be an exception or 
limitation which is already Berne-compatible. The possibility to opt-out should not be what makes an 
otherwise impermissible exception or limitation Berne-compatible. If, for example, a member state 
either denied the translation right or subjected it to compulsory licensing (an exception or limitation 
plainly inconsistent with the three-step test) unless the author expressly reserved translation rights, 
then the author would not enjoy Berne and TRIPS minimum protection without complying with 
declaratory obligations. That in turn would violate article 5(2).82  
By contrast, a member state exception that applied equally to domestic and foreign authors and 
did pass the three-step test, for example, the retransmission in bars and restaurants of radio 
 
78 Convention for the Creation of an International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 7, Sept. 
9, 1886, 12 Martens (2nd) 173; Additional Act Modifying the International Copyright Convention of 9 September 1886 
art. 7, Apr. 5, 1896, 24 Martens (2nd) 758 [hereinafter Berne 1896 Paris Revision]. 
79 Berne 1896 Paris Revision, supra note 78, art. 7. 
80 Records of the 1908 Revision Conference, supra note 75, at 249 (“Des réclamations se sont élevées de différents côtés 
dans le sens d’ un respect plus frand du droit des journalistes.”) 
81 It seems to have been assumed that the reservation would have been made by means of a notice in the newspaper or 
periodical upon initial publication, see Records of the 1908 Revision Conference, supra note 75, at 253 (quoting German 
delegation proposal). It is unlikely that the drafters envisioned further formalization of the reservation through some 
kind of governmental filing in the country of origin, much less in multiple countries: such a requirement would have too 
closely resembled the multiple formalities rejected from the outset of the Berne Union. 
82 Moreover an exception as broad as the one posited here would fail the “special case” criterion of the three-step test. 
See VAN GOMPEL, supra note 4, at 191 (“Berne Union states may not go as far as introducing overly broad exceptions of 
limitations that would have the effect of subjecting the enjoyment or the exercise of the right as such to situation-
specific formalities,” because to do so “would oppose the first of the three steps, according to which an exception or 
limitation can only be imposed in certain specific cases.”) But one could imagine a succession of more discrete 
exceptions, each individually a “special case,” but which cumulatively subjected the enjoyment of the right to compliance 
with formalities. See discussion infra. 
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broadcasts of dramatic musical compositions,83 could perhaps be made subject to an express 
reservation condition.84 In that case, the reservation would give the author greater rights than Berne 
requires. This type of condition, even if permissible, seems unlikely to garner enthusiasm among the 
advocates of “reformalizing” copyright, because it would give copyright owners more protection, 
where the goal of the reformalizers is to reduce protection.  
That said, one may acknowledge that the Berne-compatibility of a given potential exception may 
not always be clear. A cynical forecaster might therefore anticipate that the condition’s potential 
application to exceptions of uncertain Berne-compatibility could make the condition attractive to 
those who would cut back copyright protection. Inventive advocacy can expand the zone of 
otherwise Berne-compatible exceptions, soon joined on the slippery slope by exceptions deemed 
Berne-compatible because they can be opted-out of. Ultimately, the exclusive rights default could shift 
to a system of exceptions from which rightholders must reserve in order to retrieve exclusive rights. 
Here’s how the argument would go: first suppose an exception of arguable consistency with 
Berne norms, for example, digitization of out-of-print hardcopy books for nonprofit educational 
purposes. Second, give authors or their successors in title the opportunity to oppose the digitization 
and dissemination of their books. Third, apply the three-step test as follows: step one: the class of 
works covered by the exception constitutes a “special case” because the class is (arguably) well-
defined both as to the works covered (out-of-print books) and as to the use (nonprofit education). 
Step two: there is no “conflict with a normal exploitation of the work” because an out-of-print book 
isn’t being exploited, and because the author or rightsholder can secure future or derivative 
exploitations by opting-out; if the author or rightsholder doesn’t opt-out, that must mean there is no 
actual or potential market for the work, or that the author or rights holder doesn’t “care” about 
exploiting it. Step three: the exception does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate rights of the 
author because the opt-out enables the author to avoid all prejudice, unreasonable or otherwise.85 
Is this application of the three-step test consistent with Berne norms? As a preliminary matter, 
the proposition that the possibility of opting out lets the exception pass steps two and three of the 
 
83 See Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 42, ¶ 7.1(a), holding the 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) exemption of retransmissions 
of nondramatic musical compositions to violate the three-step test, but finding the application of the exemption to 
dramatic musical compositions to be compatible with the three-step test. 
84 For the reasons indicated supra note 74, any such reservation should be a one-time declaration; the author should not 
be obliged to file reservations in each country whose national law allows authors to opt out of Berne-permissible 
exceptions. 
85 Member states can satisfy the third step by providing compensation, or equitable remuneration, for the permitted use, 
but in our hypothesis there may be no need to compensate the author for uses she was neither making nor licensing. 
I do not wish to imply that an exception for non-profit educational digitization of out-of-print books could not pass 
the three-step test; on the contrary, such an exception, conditioned on the beneficiary’s performance and documentation 
of a diligent search, may well be permissible under Berne. Cf. Directive 2012/28/EU, of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 25 October 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, arts. 2(1), 6(1), 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5, 9–10 
(requiring member states to “provide for an exception to the right of reproduction and the right of making available to 
the public . . . to ensure that [certain public-interest organizations] are permitted to use orphan works contained in their 
collections in [certain educational and preservative ways]” and providing that “[a] work or a phonogram shall be 
considered an orphan work if none of the rightholders in that work or phonogram is identified or . . . located despite a 
diligent search for the rightholders having been carried out and recorded . . .”). But ruling the exception Berne-
compatible because it offers an opt-out, is highly problematic, and might well violate Berne if the opt-out substituted for a 
diligent search. 
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Berne article 9(2)/TRIPS article 13 test ignores the details of the opt-out’s implementation.  Unlike 
article 10bis(1), which creates a supra-national news reporting exception whose opt-out may be 
implemented uniformly throughout the Berne Union, the three-step test allows member states to 
tailor national exceptions to their own needs, and not all Union members’ needs or policies need be 
the same.  
Thus, member states’ exceptions may vary widely, as may the means they provide for opting out. 
The proliferation of national opt-outable exceptions imposes an increasing burden on foreign 
authors to ascertain the existence and scope of the local exceptions and to take the steps necessary 
to avoid their application.86 An author’s failure to opt out of a plethora of national exceptions 
 
86 Recent Canadian legislation offers a good example of the problems of opt-outable exceptions.  Section 30.04 of the 
“Copyright Modernization Act,” S.C. 2012, c. 20, provides: 
 
30.04 (1) Subject to subsections (2) to (5), it is not an infringement of copyright for an educational institution, 
or a person acting under the authority of one, to do any of the following acts for educational or training 
purposes in respect of a work or other subject-matter that is available through the Internet: 
    (a) reproduce it; 
    (b) communicate it to the public by telecommunication, if that public primarily consists of students of the 
educational institution or other persons acting under its authority; 
    (c) perform it in public, if that public primarily consists of students of the educational institution or other 
persons acting under its authority; or 
    (d) do any other act that is necessary for the purpose of the acts referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c). 
. . . 
(4) Subsection (1) does not permit a person to do any act described in that subsection in respect of a work or 
other subject-matter if  . . . 
    (b) a clearly visible notice — and not merely the copyright symbol — prohibiting that act is posted at the 
Internet site where the work or other subject-matter is posted or on the work or other subject-matter itself. 
 
Professor Victor Nabhan has questioned the compatibility of this provision with Berne article 5(2), and has also 
emphasized difficulties of implementation: many Internet sites enumerate permitted uses, but do not list prohibited uses 
(the prohibition of uses falling outside the authorized list should be implicit); Prof. Nabhan reads the Canadian text to 
require specific prohibition; the failure of these websites to set out a distinct prohibition of educational uses would 
therefore mean that the website author has not properly opted-out of the exception.  See Victor Nabhan, L’influence des 
usages sur le droit des exceptions - Canada : prise en compte par la loi des nouveaux usages et consécration par la jurisprudence d’un droit à 
l’exception en faveur de l’usager in L'EFFECTIVITE DES EXCEPTIONS AU DROIT D'AUTEUR ET AUX DROITS VOISINS : LES 
USAGES, LA LOI, LA REGULATION (Lamy, forthcoming 2014). 
 The tension with Berne anti-formality norms becomes all the more apparent when one considers the practical 
impact were other countries to enact similar opt-out exceptions.  Suppose, for example, in addition to Canada’s 
requirement that the author of an Internet-available work specifically prohibit reproduction or communication to the 
public (etc.) “for educational or training purposes”, that Berne member state X established out-outable exceptions for 
public performance in religious services, and Berne member state Y instituted opt-outable exceptions to the 
reproduction right for the visually impaired, and Berne member state Z provided opt-outable exceptions to all exclusive 
rights for purposes of promoting mass digitization of out-of-print works.  If, as in Canada, a general copyright notice did 
not suffice to effect the opt-out, it would seem that authors or right holders would be obliged, on a continuing basis, to 
ascertain what opt-outable exceptions each member state has enacted, and to object specifically to the permitted use.  In 
addition to the content of the objection, the manner of communicating the opt-out also may become unduly 
complicated.  For example, for Internet-available content, must the author continually update her website and the work’s 
metadata to add specific objections as member states add to their panoply?  For works in analog formats, will each 
member state create a registry of objections?  Will there be a centralized registry for opt-outs, perhaps administered by 
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through their related formalities may simply reflect limited resources, rather than a rational 
evaluation of the impact of the exception on her future exploitation of the work. The more 
complicated the opting-out, the less persuasive the empirical assumption underlying scope-
conditioning formalities, that authors do not make the necessary declarations because they do not 
“care” about how their works are exploited. Multiple diverse national opt-outs also impose a burden 
on users to determine whether, where, and to what extent unauthorized copyright-implicating acts 
may be permissible.  Thus, rather than decreasing the title-searching transaction costs, this variant on 
formalities could in practice make them more onerous. 
Moreover, exceptions can vary over time as well as between member states. Even if a one-time 
declaration at the initial public disclosure of a work may not seem unreasonably burdensome,87 
either via a copyright registry or perhaps by means of digital metadata,88 what of exceptions that 
member states enact after the work is disseminated? In such cases, the implementation of the opt-
out appears especially daunting. Even if the member state provides an effective means for authors to 
take exception, such a system would demand that authors remain constantly on guard for the loss of 
rights throughout the world as new exceptions come into force—a degree of vigilance that is even 
more demanding than registration ab initio.89 Thus, if the opt-out is what makes the exception 
Berne-permissible, then perhaps the exception cannot apply to works created before the exception’s 
enactment. But if prospective-only opt-out requirements alleviate the unfairness that would result 
from requiring old works to carry new declarations, prospectivity also seems to undermine the local 
policy concerns that prompted adoption of the exception because a prospective-only exception will 
not facilitate owner-identification and rights-clearance of older works.  
Rights+ formalities are undesirable for three other reasons as well. First, even leaving aside the 
plausibility of is premises, allowing the possibility of an opt-out to bear on the outcome of the three-
step test is particularly problematic in light of the first step. The essence of the opt-out proposal is 
 
WIPO?  The more one contemplates the implementation of national opt-outs, the more apparent their incompatibility 
with Berne norms. 
87 It seems the drafters expected that the opt-out from the news reporting exception would take the form of a 
declaration in the pages of the newspaper upon its publication. See supra note 79. 
88 Indeed, authors should be encouraged to provide rights-management information, and technologists should help 
authors achieve that end. 
89 For example, if the opt-out were contained in the copy’s metadata, the author cannot retrieve already-dispersed 
copies to amend their metadata, and (constantly) altering the metadata for new copies would simply cause confusion 
among users. This difficulty has already been noted with respect to metadata for opting out of copyright protection; 
transposing the opt-out from protection to exceptions (in effect, requiring the author to opt-in to full copyright 
protection), would appear to pose the same problem.  Cf. Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale (ALAI), 
Memorandum on Creative Commons Licenses (2006), http://www.alai.org/en/resolutions-and-positions.html: 
While [the author] can cease to offer the work herself with the license, or can offer a more restrictive 
CC license directly from her website, she will probably not be able to stop the circulation of copies 
previously accompanied by prior terms of the license. In that case, it would seem that different 
versions of CC licenses with regard to the same work might simultaneously be in force. 
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Before_Licensing#What_if_I_change_my_mind.3F: 
Creative Commons licenses are non-revocable. This means that you cannot stop someone, who has 
obtained your work under a Creative Commons license, from using the work according to that 
license. You can stop offering your work under a Creative Commons license at any time you wish; but 
this will not affect the rights associated with any copies of your work already in circulation under a 
Creative Commons license. 
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that, so long as the class is narrowly defined, the opt-out may satisfy (or override) the second two 
“steps” and the first step’s “special case” limitation itself may be eluded through a series of 
individually well-defined exceptions. Taken separately, each exception might constitute a “special 
case.” But in the aggregate the exceptions would significantly erode the formally exclusive right. This 
incremental approach to the first step would thus eviscerate the test, effectively allowing significant 
incursions on authors’ rights, so long as they are accomplished piecemeal through the back door of 
exceptions. 
Second, the more complicated the implementation of the opt-out, the more it resembles the 
multiple formalities banned from the outset of the Berne Convention. As discussed above, 
integrating the opt-out into the three-step test opens the door to the enactment of a variety of 
member state-specific exceptions and requirements—not necessarily congruent, coordinated, or 
even consistent—which risk unduly burdening authors (and users) and seem increasingly like the 
“trap for the unwary” that rightly brought formalities into disrepute.90  
Third, large and/or sophisticated copyright owners may understand the need systematically to 
opt out of exceptions and might have the means to undertake the necessary declarations. Smaller 
copyright owners and individual authors may not understand the opt-out regime (nor, depending on 
how it was implemented, be in a position to assume its burdens). The opt-out therefore would 
perpetuate, and aggravate, the disparate impact that formalities systems already wreak on individual 
creators.91 As a general proposition, an exception should pass three-step muster on its own merits; if 
it does not, then, as this analysis has shown, adding an opt-out feature will not save the exception 
from Berne-incompatibility.  
III. OWNERSHIP 
A. DECLARATORY DUTIES PERTAINING TO COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP ARE NOT BERNE-BANNED 
“FORMALITIES” 
Berne article 5(2) prohibits formalities that limit the “enjoyment or exercise” of copyright. It 
does not address declaratory measures concerning ownership of rights. Yet those measures may be 
the most pertinent to title-searching. If I am correct that Berne bars measures that condition how a 
right is exercised, but not who exercises it, then member states may achieve many of the positive, 
rights clearance-facilitating, goals of formalities, without violating international norms.92 Moreover, 
member states may apply not only carrots but also sticks to encourage compliance with ownership-
related formal or declaratory obligations, by making the validity of a transfer of rights contingent on 
fulfilling those obligations. 
 
90 [Cross-reference to Jule Sigall’s contribution to the symposium] 
91 Note that a declaratory condition on a user’s exercise of an exception, such as an obligation to document a diligent 
search in order to qualify for an “orphan works” limitation, see Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 25 March 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, art. 3(5), 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5, 9, would 
not be a “formality” in the sense of Berne article 5(2) because the beneficiary of the exception, not the author or right 
holder, incurs the declaratory obligation. 
92 Accord Melville B. Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and the United States Copyright Law, 
19 STAN. L. REV. 499, 544 (1967). 
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For example, many (probably most) member states deny effect to transfers of exclusive rights 
that are not in writing and signed by the author or other transferor. Commentators agree that this 
author-protective constraint is not a Berne-forbidden “formality.”93 Similarly, national copyright-
contract rules that, for example, condition the validity of a transfer of particular rights on the 
specific mention of future new technology rights,94 or on separately stating and providing 
proportional remuneration for each mode of exploitation,95 are formal protections of the author as 
the weaker party, and are not “formalities” in the Berne sense.96 
In addition to mandating a signed writing to effectuate the transfer, U.S. copyright law seeks to 
encourage recordation of transfers through a combination of evidentiary advantages and prospective 
invalidity in the event of conflicting transfers: the first-filing bona fide purchaser for value prevails 
over the earlier transferee.97 I would more boldly posit going beyond the hypothesis of conflicting 
transfers to make the validity of the transfer itself contingent on the transferee’s recordation of the 
contract or “a note or memorandum of the transfer.”98 While a duty to record a transfer of exclusive 
rights performs a more public-regarding function (to facilitate rights clearance) than does the 
requirement of a signed writing, in neither case does the sanction of invalidity deprive the author of 
copyright protection (on the contrary, in some instances it may have the effect of returning the 
rights to her). 
B. IF CONDITIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE TRANSFER ON ITS RECORDATION IS BERNE-
PERMISSIBLE, IS IT A GOOD IDEA?  
Of all the declaratory measures (whether or not they are “formalities” in the Berne sense), the 
one most likely to facilitate rights-clearance is recordation. The debate over “orphan works” has 
shown that the most important impediment to finding right owners is the lack of a reliable chain of 
title.99 A work may have been registered, and its registration renewed, but compliance with those 
formalities does little good if there is no record of subsequent changes in ownership. An invalidity 
 
93 See, e.g., VAN GOMPEL, supra note 4, ¶ 5.3.2.2, at 204 (These requirements essentially determine the way in which the 
author can legally transfer his copyright. Rather than affecting the enjoyment or the exercise of copyright, therefore, they 
establish the extent to which the author can exploit his rights. As much as the Berne Convention permits contracting 
states to preclude the assignment of copyright or create certain presumption of assignment, it allows them to establish 
the condition under which copyright can be assigned, including the requirements of form relating to the validity of a 
contract.); 1 Berne Book, supra note 13, ¶ 6.105, at 326–27. 
94 See, e.g., CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE art. L131-6 (Fr.); Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte 
Schutzrechte (Urheberrechtsgesetz) [Copyright Act], as amended, § 31a (Ger.). 
95 See, e.g., CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE arts. L131-3 (each right granted must be the object of explicit 
mention and delimited as to scope, purpose, place and duration), l 131-4 (requirement of proportional participation in 
revenues from the grant) (Fr.). 
96 See, e.g., VAN GOMPEL, supra note 4, ¶[must find pincite]. 
97 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (“recordation as constructive notice”); (d) (“priority between conflicting transfers”). Recordation 
statutes of this kind are hardly unique to copyright; they figure importantly in transfers of real property and chattels. See 
generally BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE: THEORY AND POLICY OF 
CONTRACTUAL REGISTRIES (2012), reprinted in THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 905 (2d ed. 2012).   
98 Cf. 17 U.S.C. §§ 204(a) (transfer not valid unless “an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the 
transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed …”), 205(c) (setting minimum requirements for 
recorded document to provide constructive notice to public). 
99 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 26-34 (2006) (describing obstacles to title searching). 
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sanction for noncompliance with an obligation to record transfers of exclusive rights100 would 
appear to furnish a strong, Berne-compatible incentive to the creation of reliable title-searching 
records,101 but how would it work? Devilish details in the implementation of the duty include: costs 
and deadlines, gaps in the title-searching record, and the application of the requirement to works of 
non-U.S. origin.  
1. Practical concerns 
a) Cost 
At the moment, the cost of recording a document in the Copyright Office is $105 for one 
document, and an additional $30 for each group of 10 documents.102 This fee may not daunt 
transferees who are commercial actors, but one should inquire whether there is a class of transferees 
for whom the fees are a disincentive to recordation. If recordation is a prerequisite to validity of the 
transfer, it may be necessary to introduce some flexibility into the fee schedule. Current realities in 
the Copyright Office sound another somber note: not all recordation records are digitized or 
searchable online.103 For the recordation records to perform their desired rights-clearing function, 
they must be fully accessible. Moreover, the information to be recorded should be standardized and 
should clearly identify the works at issue and the rights transferred. Fairness, too, may require a well-
functioning recordation system before a transferee incurs the risk of invalidity for failure to 
record.104 
 
100 Some states make recordation a condition of the validity of transfer of title to automobiles. See., e.g., N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 20-72(b) 
In order to assign or transfer title or interest in any motor vehicle registered under the provisions of 
this Article, the owner shall execute in the presence of a person authorized to administer oaths an 
assignment and warranty of title on the reverse of the certificate of title in form approved by the 
Division, including in such assignment the name and address of the transferee; and no title to any 
motor vehicle shall pass or vest until such assignment is executed and the motor vehicle delivered to 
the transferee. 
101 A more modest sanction, making recordation a prerequisite to suit, would run afoul of Berne article 5(2) because it 
would be a pre-condition to enforcement. The 1976 Copyright Act’s original section 205(d) included a pre-suit 
recordation obligation, which was eliminated when the United States joined Berne. See Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 566 (1986) (“[w]ith respect to works of 
foreign origin, section 205(d) is incompatible with Berne, since it requires recordation as a prerequisite to suit and 
thereby may affect the exercise of copyright”); S. Rep. No. 100-352, at 26 (1988). Ironically the more draconian sanction, 
invalidating the transfer, appears more consistent with Berne than a sanction that preserves the transfer but deprives the 
non-recording transferee of standing to sue. 
102 http://www.copyright.gov/document.html (calculating fees for recording documents in the copyright office). 
103 See Copyright Office Circular 12 at 6. 
104 Whether recordation should remain centralized in the Copyright Office, or be distributed across a variety of 
databases is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. Pamela Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The Copyright Principles 
Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1203–05 (2010) (recommending “networked and 
interoperable private registries”). 
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b) Timing 
If the validity of the transfer will turn on its recordation, how much time may elapse until the 
transferee records?105 And what is the event that starts the clock running? Execution of the transfer 
would seem a normal starting point, but “execution” may not mean the same thing as signing an 
agreement. As the Copyright Office’s inquiry into “Gap Grants” revealed, agreements to transfer 
rights may be entered into before the work has been created. The Office determined that the grant 
was not “executed” until the work which was the object of the transfer of rights came into being.106 
By the same token, the recordation obligation should vest at the date of conclusion of a transfer 
respecting an extant work, or, for grants in anticipation of a work’s creation, at the date of creation. 
As for deadlines, section 205(d) allows a grace period of one month for transfers executed in the 
United States, and two months for transfers executed abroad, before a first-filing subsequent bona 
fide transferee will be awarded title despite the prior transfer. Similar deadlines might apply to the 
validity of the transfer in general (not just in the case of conflicting transfers). But it will be 
important to ensure that judicial interpretation of the recordation prerequisite to validity does not 
dilute the duty’s prescriptive force. Inconsistent case law under the section 204(a) requirement of a 
signed writing serves as a warning. Some courts construing that obligation perceive the writing 
simply as a confirmation of an oral agreement which effectively transferred the rights, and therefore 
tolerate even years of delay before the agreement is reduced to writing. Others, correctly applying 
the statutory language, rule that there is no transfer without a writing, and therefore demand closer 
contemporaneity between the agreement and its expression in writing.107  
2. Gaps in the record  
a) Initial registration 
The invalidity sanction attaches to failure to record transfers of title to exclusive rights. A title 
search-aiding record of a transfer requires a starting point to evidence the initial title holder from 
whom the chain of title springs. But an obligation to record initial title looks like a registration 
requirement, a formality that does run afoul of Berne if the sanction for noncompliance divests or 
disables the copyright. It may nonetheless be possible to achieve registration without punishing 
authors. Recall that the sanction for non-recordation burdens not the initial title holder (the author), 
but the grantee. If the author has voluntarily registered the copyright in the work, then the starting 
point will be in place. In the absence of an initial registration, the grantee should effect both the 
 
105 See generally Alan Latman, The Recordation of Copyright Assignments and Licenses, Copyright Study No. 19 (1958), reprinted 
in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 761, 766-74 (1963) (addressing grace periods under the 1909 Act and proposals for 
reform). 
106 At issue was the terminability under § 203 of the 1976 Act of agreements concluded before the effective date of the 
1976 Act with respect to works created thereafter. See United States Copyright Office, Analysis of Gap Grants Under the 
Termination Provisions of Title 17 (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.copyright.gov/reports/gap-grant-analysis.pdf. 
107 Compare Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 2011); 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.03[A][3] at nn. 20–22 (Rev. Ed. 2009) (treating § 204(a) as a mere statute of frauds, not 
affecting the validity of the transfer), with Konigsberg Int’l Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 1994) (treating § 204(a) 
as more than a statute of frauds, but a requirement for validity); Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 933, 936–
37 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (same); 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:106 (“Although [§ 204(a) is] occasionally referred to as a 
Statute of Frauds provision, this is an incomplete description.”). 
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registration and the recordation of transfer.108 The Copyright Act and current Copyright Office 
practices enable this gap-filling by the transferee: Section 409(5), which details the contents of the 
registration form, provides: “if the copyright claimant is not the author, [the claimant shall include] a 
brief statement of how the claimant obtained ownership of the copyright.”109  
So long as the transfer remains unrecorded (and assuming no supervening recorded conflicting 
transfer) the grantee would not be an “owner” of copyright. But the signed writing could be treated 
as effecting a nonexclusive license, much as a nonexclusive license may be inferred from conduct or 
oral agreement.110 Because the license is in writing, however, it would survive a subsequent recorded 
transfer of exclusive rights, while an unwritten nonexclusive license would be extinguished.111 
Arguably, since a recordation record that did not disclose the existence of a prior nonexclusive 
license could mislead the purchaser as to the effective scope of the rights granted, it would be more 
consistent with the present proposal were the persistence of a nonexclusive license against a 
subsequent grant of exclusive rights to be conditioned on the license’s recordation. But a purchaser 
may protect herself by requiring the transferor to warrant the absence of exclusive and nonexclusive 
licenses.112 And because a nonexclusive licensee lacks standing to sue,113 the non-recordation of a 
nonexclusive license does not prejudice users. The nonexclusive licensee would be obliged to join 
the copyright-retaining licensor to the infringement action, but, at least assuming an initial 
 
108 See Latman, supra note 105, at 776-77: 
[I]t has been suggested that the present system of registering copyright claims be dropped in favor of 
a more elaborate approach to the recordation of transfers of copyright. The key to an effective 
recording system is its completeness, and ideally all links in a chain of title should be placed on record. 
In the absence of a basic registry system, identifying the work, the first owner of the copyright, the 
date from which the term is computed, and other pertinent information, the recording of transfers 
would often fail to identify the work covered by the transfer, the term of copyright, and especially the 
derivation of the transferee’s claim to ownership. On the other hand, it may be contended that it is 
asking too much of an assignee not only to record his own assignment but also to register the initial 
claim and to record any intervening assignments. 
109 Registration forms, available on the Copyright Office website, provide further detail, see, e.g., Form TX, instructions 
for filling out “space 4”: 
Transfer: The statute provides that, if the copyright claimant is not the author, the application for 
registration must contain “a brief statement of how the claimant obtained ownership of the 
copyright.” If any copyright claimant named in space 4 is not an author named in space 2, give a brief 
statement explaining how the claimant(s) obtained ownership of the copyright. Examples: “By written 
contract”; “Transfer of all rights by author”; “Assignment”; “By will.” Do not attach transfer 
documents or other attachments or riders. 
110 See, e.g., Effects Associates v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558–59 (9th Cir. 1990). 
111 See 17 U.S.C. § 205(e).  
112 See, e.g., PERLE & WILLIAMS ON PUBLISHING LAW § 2.06 (Mark A. Fisher et al., eds., 2010 Supp.) (“Writer has not 
previously . . . encumbered” the rights conveyed). 
113 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (owners of copyright have standing to sue); a non-exclusive licensee is not an “owner” see, e.g., 
Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2008): 
Under copyright law, only copyright owners and exclusive licensees of copyright may enforce a 
copyright or license. Therefore, third party strangers and nonexclusive licensees cannot bring suit to 
enforce a copyright, even if an infringer is operating without a license to the detriment of a 
nonexclusive licensee who has paid full value for his license. 
(citations omitted) 
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registration or prior recordation of transfer, the public will be on notice of who owns the relevant 
rights. 
b) Transfers by operation of  law 
Even with a recordation prerequisite to the validity of a transfer, other gaps in the chain of title 
may result from transfers by operation of law. Examples of such transfers include: divorce; 
inheritance by intestate succession, and perhaps by will;114 corporate mergers, acquisitions, 
restructuring;115 and involuntary transfers in bankruptcy proceedings.116 The regimes governing these 
transfers may include their own recordation requirements; perhaps those records could be linked to 
copyright records. Failing that, it would be desirable to consider the circumstances under which it 
would be appropriate to impose an additional burden of copyright recordation on the trustee in 
bankruptcy, testamentary executor, and other transferees by operation of law. In any event, the duty 
to record would continue to bind one who acquires exclusive rights from the transferee. 
Authors’ statutory reversion rights pose an instance akin to transfers by operation of law. The 
present Copyright Act recognizes the important public interest in knowing whether an author has 
reclaimed her rights under the section 203 termination provision (as well as under the section 304(c) 
and (d) extended renewal termination rights), because the Act requires authors (or others qualified to 
terminate) to record in the Copyright Office a copy of the notice of termination “before the 
effective date of termination, as a condition to its taking effect.”117 Thus, recordation is already a 
condition of the validity of the statutory reversion.  
What of contractual reversions, such as provided in out-of-print clauses or as the parties may in 
any event agree at some time after the execution of the transfer? Or for that matter, what of a time-
limited grant of rights? In the last case, the recordation of the initial grant will show its duration, 
which should put the public on notice that after that time (assuming no subsequent grant), the rights 
have returned to the author. But with respect to reversions of rights initially granted for the full term 
of copyright, should a recordation obligation condition the author’s retrieval of her rights?118 The 
public interest in knowing who owns the rights does not wane with the change in the legal basis of 
 
114 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1); see, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1114 
(9th Cir. 2000) (finding bequest of all real and personal property sufficient to transfer copyright); Forster Music 
Publishers Inc. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 62 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (applying state law of intestate 
succession to copyright under 1909 Act). 
115 See, e.g., U.S. Home Corp. v. R.A. Kot Homes, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975 (D. Minn. 2008) (holding that 
corporate merger transferred copyright by “operation of law” under § 204(a) “without any ‘further act or deed’ on the 
part [of] the surviving company”); cf. Cincom Systems v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 432 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding 
infringement on copyright by surviving corporate entity following merger with licensee of copyright, where license was 
non-assignable; noting that “[f]ederal common law governs questions with respect to the assignability of a patent or 
copyright license”). 
116 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (permitting involuntary transfer under bankruptcy laws); Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc. v. 
Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d 628, 636 (D. Md. 2006) (in federal copyright law, “transfers by operation of law are expressly 
limited to voluntary transfers, except in bankruptcy proceedings.”). See also Kunkel v. Jasin, 420 F. App’x 198, 200 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (a debtor in bankruptcy may not register a copyright in his own name; since the author’s copyright passed to 
the bankruptcy estate, only the estate may register the copyright.) 
117 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(4)(A); 304(c)(4)(A), (d)(1). 
118 Or for a negotiated reversion occurring before the expiration of the duration of the grant covering less than the full 
term of copyright. 
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the reversion. On the other hand, the recordation obligation, posited in its initial guise, did not 
divest authors - if anything, the author retained whatever rights her transferee failed to record. Given 
the remedial role of reversion, we might be reluctant to make the author’s rights depend on 
recordation. In fact, however, we already impose such an obligation with respect to statutory 
termination rights, where the author’s moral claims to reversion may be even more compelling than 
for contractual reversions, precisely because statutory reversions are designed to make up for 
authors’ generally weaker bargaining position.119 Nonetheless, lest authors’ incipient reversionary 
interests in current contracts be frustrated by failure to record the revesting of the rights, any 
mandatory obligation that contractual reversions be recorded should be purely prospective, 
applicable only to contracts executed after the effective date of a statutory amendment imposing 
recordation as a condition of the validity of the grant.120 
3. Application to Berne works of  non-U.S. origin 
Finally, how would a recordation obligation apply to transfers of U.S. rights in works of non-
U.S. origin? By virtue of the Berne Convention and other multilateral instruments, a Berne Union 
author, upon the work’s creation or first publication anywhere in the Berne Union, initially owns the 
copyright in the work in every other Berne Union country.121 So a French author owns the U.S. 
rights in her work from the outset, long before she may in fact exploit them (if ever). Under what 
circumstances should a U.S. recordation obligation apply to the French author’s transfer of rights 
for a territory that includes the United States? If the transferee is a U.S. resident, the U.S. 
recordation obligation should apply (with respect to the transfer of U.S. rights), just as it would for a 
transfer of U.S. rights from a U.S. author. If the transferee is not a U.S. resident, and if the transfer 
covers multiple territories, recordation as a prerequisite to validity might seem more problematic 
from a practical perspective. That said, anyone acquiring U.S. rights, whether local or foreign, ought 
already, as part of due diligence, to be consulting the recordation of title in the Copyright Office; 
 
119 See id. § 203(a)(5)(“Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary”); § 
304(c)(5) (same). 
120 To the extent that the principal contractual reversion results from “out of print” clauses, the gradual disappearance 
of these clauses from digital-age publishing contracts, see The Future of Electronic Publishing: A Panel Discussion, 25 COLUM 
J.L. & ARTS 91, 112 (2002) (statement of Lois F. Wasoff, Vice President & Corporate Counsel, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, Chair, Copyright Committee, Association of American Publishers) (hypothesizing that “we are going to start 
to see ‘out of print’ clauses being replaced by ‘minimum revenue’ clauses” in which “if the publisher is generating less 
than a certain amount of revenue, the author can demand the rights back”); Stephen Manes, Surfing and Stealing: An 
Author’s Perspective, 23 COLUM.–VLA J.L. & ARTS 127, 132 (1999): 
Authors are beginning to demand and receive radically changed out-of-print clauses that allow the 
author to demand a reversion of rights in any year that the sales figures or dollar volume from the 
book fail to reach a particular level, or by simply doing what hardcover publishers are smart enough to 
do with their paperback sublicenses: limiting the licenses to a fixed period. 
Cf. Lionel Bently & Jane C. Ginsburg, “The Sole Right . . . Shall Return to the Authors”: Anglo-American Authors’ Reversion 
Rights from the Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S. Copyright, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1475, 1554 n.382 (2010) (observing 
“publishers, rather than authors, appear to have had the most to gain from allowing the author to recapture her 
copyright” in order to reduce, among other things, “the expenses of . . . business tax on inventory items[] and costs of 
warehousing and concomitant efforts for ‘tighter inventory control,’” burdens that are less significant in the digital 
context (citations omitted)), may moot the problem. If the re-vesting of rights follows a rescission of the agreement, the 
rescission might be treated as a new contract which the parties should record.  
121 Berne, supra note 8, arts. 3, 5(1). 
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requiring that the acquirer in turn record does not seem a significant additional burden. In any event, 
the current Copyright Act contemplates foreign transferees because it allows them an additional 
month before a subsequent bona fide acquirer’s recordation can preempt their transfer.122 But there 
is a difference between recordation to negate the risk of conflicting transfers and recordation as a 
condition of the validity of the transfer of the U.S. rights123 ab initio. The latter approach may place 
too high a burden on foreign transferees, particularly if their imminent likelihood of exploiting the 
U.S. rights is at best inchoate, or if the work has not already been the object of a Copyright Office 
registration. A middle course would be to require a foreign transferee whose grant explicitly covers 
the United States to effect the recordation.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
One critic of international copyright norms has complained that the claim “Can't do it because 
it’s a Berne violation” is “an all-too-common refrain to torpedo numerous ideas for improving or 
modernizing our copyright system.”124 The Berne Convention and related treaty obligations may 
constrain the implementation of good ideas for the copyright system (so far as the ideas apply to 
Union authors). Happily, however, our treaty obligations also frustrate efforts to implement bad 
ideas that would expropriate (foreign) authors. 
“Formalities” in the Berne sense of prohibited conditions on the existence, scope, and exercise 
of copyright, are bad ideas because they further confiscatory policies, deny the dignity of creation, 
and confine copyright to its economic dimension.125 Declaratory measures, which advance the 
considerable public benefit of establishing and maintaining chains of title, not only are good ideas 
“for improving . . . our copyright system,” they also are consistent with our international 
obligations.126 The principal measure this Article proposes, conditioning validity of transfer of 
copyright on recordation of a note or memorandum of the transfer, is Berne-compatible because, 
while Berne protects the interests of successors in title, it does not regulate the means by which one 
becomes a successor in title. That is for the member state whose law governs the transfer.  
 
122 17 U.S.C. § 409(5).  
123 While a contract transferring multiterritorial rights may as a whole be governed by the law chosen by the parties, or 
in the absence of a choice of law, by the law of the country with the closest connection to the contract, see, e.g., American 
Law Institute, American Law Institute: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, 
CHOICE OF LAW AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES § 315(1)(2) (2008), the laws of the countries for 
which the rights are transferred will apply to determine the validity of the transfers, id. § 314; Corcovado Music Corp. v. 
Hollis Music, Inc., 981 F.2d 679 (2nd Cir. 1993). See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT 151 (2d ed. 2010) (arguing that local recording systems and priority rules receive “primacy over conflicting 
contract terms” on the grounds of “deference to local judgments in the efficient operation of a title priority system” and 
“absence of universal treaty agreements governing priorities”). 
124 Edward Lee, Copyright, Death, and Taxes, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 3 (2012) (citing, inter alia, Jane C. Ginsburg, 
The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311 (2010)). 
125 [Cross-reference to Niva Elkin-Koren’s contribution to this Symposium] 
126 By contrast, the “new-style formalities” proposal advanced by Sprigman not only would penalize authors but also 
relies upon the tendentious assertion that the Berne Convention does not require injunctive relief. Sprigman, supra note 
2, at 558–59. As discussed above, supra notes 41–52and accompanying text, this runs counter to both the background 
norms of copyright and the mandate of Berne and TRIPS. 
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Reliable title records benefit both the public and authors by reducing search costs and facilitating 
mutually beneficial transactions. Moreover, by easing the flow of information about copyright 
ownership, Berne-compatible declaratory obligations could - without penalizing authors - alleviate 
the ills that purportedly justify calls for the return of confiscatory formalities. Rights of ostensibly 
little value to their owners—because they relate to works that are only minimally original, or too 
obscure, or too old—are much less problematic if their owners can readily be found and the rights 
easily acquired.  Were rights-clearance no longer to impose high transactions costs, the remaining 
impetus for reformalizing copyright would plainly emerge: for copyright reformalizers, “new-style” 
or otherwise, the fault lies not in copyright’s alleged unmanageability, but in the current contours of 
copyright itself. 
